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Persistent ecological and socio-economic impacts from the expansion of industrial
monocultures in the tropics have raised land use sustainability to the top of the
environmental policy agenda. Asmajor crops such as soy continue to experience growing
market demand and threaten both natural ecosystems and traditional populations,
a number of multi-stakeholder governance initiatives have been established around
agricultural commodity chains or key landscapes. Effectiveness in curbing unsustainable
land use, however, remains limited. In this context, innovative initiatives have blurred
the lines to combine both supply chain and landscape governance. We analyze
such arrangements—here conceptualized as commodity-centric landscape governance
(CCLG)—with an in-depth case study of the Cerrado Working Group, a multi-
stakeholder initiative led by civil society and the soy agribusiness to address land use
change in that savanna landscape in Brazil. The paper examines how that initiative
has come about, its agenda, as well as usually underexposed political dimensions
using agenda-setting theory. The research is based on extensive fieldwork in Brazil,
with data collected through document analysis and 56 key-informant interviews. The
findings suggest that a sustainable development agenda for the Cerrado has been
substantially narrowed to become mostly one of conversion-free soy supply, serving
more the interests of that agroindustry and its consumers than those of the landscape’s
most vulnerable stakeholders, such as local communities. While the Cerrado Working
Group has importantly broadened the policy scope beyond commodity certification,
its limited inclusiveness and a skewed agenda have led to instruments that target
only soy farmers as beneficiaries. We conclude that, although effective for targeting
conversion drivers, CCLG can crystallize and reinforce existing land use patterns by
granting disproportionate power to dominant stakeholders, thus limiting the agenda to
incremental changes. As a consequence, distant demand-side actors may exert greater
governance authority than the landscape’s own population. If embodying norms of
inclusiveness and equitable participation, CCLG may serve as an entry point, but it does
not per se replace inclusive land-use planning and integrated landscape governance.
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INTRODUCTION
Land use governance has come to the fore as a major
sustainability issue, particularly for tropical regions of the world,
where land use change—primarily deforestation for agricultural
expansion—is a key driver of global climate change and
biodiversity loss (Lambin et al., 2018; Gardner et al., 2019). In
South America, valuable ecosystems such as the Amazon and the
Cerrado (Brazil’s highly biodiverse savanna) have continuously
given way to cattle ranching andmonoculture farming, especially
soy (Rausch et al., 2019). These are landscape transformations
with not only ecological but also social impacts, such as on
livelihoods, land rights, and local food security (Borras et al.,
2012). These are also global processes, as a large share of those
land use changes are driven by agricultural commodity exports,
particularly to Europe and China (Yao et al., 2018; Pendrill
et al., 2019). However, the policy and governance setting for
addressing such land use issues remains fragmented and full
of gaps. Most tropical countries suffer from limited domestic
regulations, ill-functioning institutions, low enforcement, and
shortage both of resources and political will (Lambin et al., 2014).
Binding international agreements on sustainable land use and
ecosystem protection are also absent, as these issues tend to evoke
sovereignty sensibilities and arguments around national interests
(Dimitrov, 2005; Bastos Lima and Gupta, 2014).
In this complex context, two main types of governance
have emerged. On the one hand, there have been myriad
sustainable supply chain initiatives in the forms of multi-
stakeholder roundtables, commodity certification, and public
or private demand-side policies to promote sustainable land
use (Lambin and Thorlakson, 2018; Lambin et al., 2018). They
include, for instance, the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil
(RSPO), the Round Table on Responsible Soy (RTRS), as well
as consumer-country regulations with extraterritorial effects
such as France’s due diligence law or the European Union’s
sustainability criteria for biofuel feedstocks (Bastos Lima and
Gupta, 2014; Cossart et al., 2017). These initiatives usually are
consumer-driven, aspire to be globally applicable, and not rarely
encounter resistance from producer countries that resent the
imposition of (foreign) environmental standards (Bastos Lima
andGupta, 2014). On the other hand, there has also been growing
inclination to landscape or jurisdictional approaches, understood
as holistic strategies to accommodate for different actors, sectors,
needs, interests, and often competing land use claims in a
given geography (Arts et al., 2017). They include various sub-
national initiatives, such as the Produce, Conserve, and Include
(PCI) strategy by the Brazilian state of Mato Grosso, as well as
implementation of global programs such as REDD+ (Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) with the
help of international climate finance (Boyd et al., 2018; Stickler et
al., 2018).
Some initiatives, however, have combined the commodity
focus with a landscape approach, targeting a specific commodity
identified as an important driver of change in a given
place. Two examples of such initiatives are the Cerrado
Working Group (Grupo de Trabalho do Cerrado—GTC)
and the Amazon-centered Soy Working Group (Grupo de
Trabalho da Soja—GTS) in Brazil. They have involved civil
society organizations, the soy sector, government actors, and
institutionalized relations also with demand-side players while
developing landscape-specific policy instruments. A landmark
achievement by the GTS is the Amazon Soy Moratorium, which
has successfully reduced forest clearing for soy by having traders
agree not to source from areas deforested after 2008 (Gibbs et al.,
2015). The GTC, which emerged as an offshoot of the GTS,
has established negotiations also with foreign buyers to propose
a variety of policy instruments, most notably the possibility
of payments for conservation of Cerrado vegetation beyond
legal requirements.
This paper conceptualizes the GTS and GTC as commodity-
centric landscape governance (CCLG), defined here as a mode
of landscape governance that is both landscape-specific and
centered around an important commodity of concern. Both
initiatives signify governance innovation, but they have not yet
been sufficiently analyzed through a political science lens in terms
of how they involve views and concerns of different stakeholders,
how they came about, their achievements and limitations so
far, or their prospects. Here we appraise the features, risks and
opportunities of CCLG, drawing from the 10 years of GTS
experience and focusing particularly on the GTC’s policies and
structure. In so doing, we broaden the analytical scope—usually
limited to the environmental impacts of those initiatives—to
include also issues of equity and participation, as well as the
links between inclusiveness and effectiveness. For this analysis,
we utilize agenda-setting theory, scholarship on power relations,
the conservation policy literature, as well as agri-food governance
debates around food security and sustainability.
This qualitative research is mostly exploratory in nature.
It relies on the triangulation of multiple sources of evidence,
including scientific literature on the Cerrado, primary sources
such as GTC meeting briefs, and 56 semi-structured interviews
with key stakeholders in Brazil. The stakeholders were selected
either due to their direct participation in GTC negotiations or
expertise on Cerrado environmental policy, using a snowball
sampling technique. The interviews were conducted between
October and December 2018, in Portuguese (by the first
author, who is Brazilian), with representatives from the soy
agribusiness, environmental NGOs, grassroots organizations, as
well as government officials at national and sub-national levels,
to accommodate for a diversity of perspectives by GTC members
and non-members alike. Besides information on the GTC’s
background and structure, they were asked for views on the
group’s composition and agenda. Direct quotations are used
to illustrate various stakeholder views with their own words
and to enable voice. However, due to the political sensitivity
of these issues the full anonymity of all interviewees and their
organizations has been ensured.
The article is structured as follows. First, we briefly review
the literature on landscape approaches to develop the concept
of CCLG, before elaborating an analytical framework based on
agenda setting. After briefly presenting the context in which
the GTC emerged, we examine its agenda-setting process and
particularly the prospects of its main initial policy proposition:
payments for conservation. We draw lessons on the strengths
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and weaknesses of CCLG as an emerging governance format and
conclude with recommendations for further research.
ON GOVERNING LANDSCAPES: A
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Landscape Approaches and
Commodity-Centric Landscape
Governance (CCLG)
Landscapes are coherent socio-ecological systems or land
systems with a set of biophysical, socio-economic, cultural and
institutional characteristics (Freeman et al., 2015; Arts et al.,
2017; Meyfroidt et al., 2019). They generally are multifunctional
geographical spaces where different land uses, objectives,
interests and stakeholders interact (O’Farrell and Andersson,
2010; Kozar et al., 2014). As such, landscapes are also political
spaces, and they can orientate governance initiatives even when
their boundaries do not coincide with formal jurisdictions (Kozar
et al., 2014; Ros-Tonen et al., 2018; Van Oosten et al., 2018).
The acceptance of multifunctionality as a prevalent feature of
landscapes, in turn, has given rise to the concept of “landscape
approach.” Although it remains loosely defined, a landscape
approach is generally understood as one that regards multiple
uses, sectors and actors within the boundaries of a coherent
geographical space (Sayer et al., 2013; Arts et al., 2017; Reed
et al., 2017). Crucially, it aims to reconcile conservation and
production goals, environment and development agendas (Reed
et al., 2016). At times, the qualifier of “integrated” landscape
approach is used to explicitly emphasize this holistic regard (see
Freeman et al., 2015). There is not, however, one single integrated
landscape approach, but rather multiple ways of pursuing it
in practice (Milder et al., 2014; Bastos Lima et al., 2017; Reed
et al., 2017). Alternatively, these are sometimes also referred to
as integrated landscape-level initiatives (Zanzanaini et al., 2017;
Ros-Tonen et al., 2018).
Landscape approaches have become key in land use
policy debates, particularly as ways to reconcile agricultural
development and forest conservation in the tropics (Stickler et
al., 2018). They are sometimes conflated with “jurisdictional
approaches,” when there is a high level of government
involvement from a given jurisdiction, and thus have become
increasingly common ways of implementing international
policies such as REDD+ (Boyd et al., 2018). As both the GTS
and the GTC illustrate, however, landscape-level initiatives do
not always correspond to a jurisdiction, nor do they necessarily
have to rely on substantive government participation. Either
way, these initiatives have sometimes been challenged by and
been unable to address outside drivers of land use change such
as national-level policies or international market demand for
agricultural commodities (Bastos Lima et al., 2017).
Supply chain sustainability initiatives, usually not bound to
a particular landscape but national or global in scope (e.g.,
RSPO, RTRS, Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil), have also
become increasingly keen on moving “beyond certification”
and the logic of premium prices (Poynton, 2015). Through
suggestions for “jurisdictional certification” (Nepstad et al.,
2013), the gap between geography-centric and commodity-
centric approaches is becoming blurred and may be moving
toward hybrid formats. Indeed, how landscape governance can
effectively reduce sourcing risks (e.g., through the creation of
verified sourcing areas) and how supply chain initiatives can
be entry points for integrated landscape approaches have been
key research frontiers (Kissinger et al., 2013; Deans et al., 2018;
Ingram et al., 2018; Lambin et al., 2018; Ros-Tonen et al., 2018).
In regions where one or more agricultural commodities stand
out as drivers of land use change, their supply chains have become
central to landscape governance, as in the cases of the GTS
or of the G4 and MPF-TAC cattle agreements in the Brazilian
Amazon (Gibbs et al., 2015, 2016), deforestation-free palm oil
in Borneo (Van Houten and De Koning, 2018), or sustainable
cocoa in Ghana (Deans et al., 2018). We conceptualize such
initiatives as commodity-centric landscape governance (CCLG),
for its features arguably allow for characterizing it as a specific
(sub)type of landscape approach. They are, on the one hand,
multi-sectoral in their attempt to accommodate both agricultural
and environmental demands, multiple policy fields, conservation
and production land uses, and a set of public and private actors
beyond the ones who are part of the supply chain. On the other
hand, they do focus on a key driver of land use change to
be addressed as an “anchor commodity,” also to engage more
systemically with relevant actors from outside the landscape such
as buyers and investors.
As CCLG becomes increasingly common for governing
agriculture-forest frontiers in the tropics, we argue that it is key
to have the conceptual tools to analyze such a governance format:
how it emerges, why, by whom, its achievements, limitations,
and implications within the respective landscape and beyond. For
landscape governance involves not only the technical challenges
of dealing with sometimes conflictive goals and their trade-offs,
but crucially also with the questions of whose objectives count
or receive priority, what challenges are recognized, how they are
framed and addressed, who gets to decide, how this in turn affects
conservation and welfare outcomes, as well as who benefits from
these outcomes (Pascual et al., 2014; Kusters et al., 2018).
A key reason for exploring these questions is not only that
issues of inclusion and equity are important in and of themselves,
but also that power asymmetries can play a key role in landscape
governance and broadly affect environmental outcomes (Duff
et al., 2009; Ros-Tonen et al., 2015). The effectiveness of policy
instruments under landscape-level initiatives depends not only
on (1) their direct outcomes, achieved via included actors
(compared to what would have been the case without the
institution, what is commonly termed its additionality). Also
(2) the number of actors included and (3) the instrument’s
indirect effects (spillovers) on those who are excluded are key
to understanding effectiveness on a landscape level (see Borck
and Coglianese, 2009, as well as Börner et al., 2017; Garrett
et al., 2019). As such, a more inclusive institution may be more
effective not only because it affects the behavior of more actors,
but also because a conservation intervention that is perceived
as too exclusive or unfair is more likely to result in negative
spillovers (Börner et al., 2017). Thus, there may be not only
trade-offs between inclusiveness and conservation effectiveness,
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which need to be dealt with politically (Arts et al., 2017), but
also synergies as fair and inclusive governance may boost also
conservation outcomes through increased legitimacy and buy-
in from landscape actors (Sayer et al., 2015). A key focus of our
analysis of the GTC below is therefore how and to what extent
multiple uses, actors and objectives have indeed been accounted
for in processes and proposed instruments.
Political Dimensions of Landscape
Governance: Inclusiveness, Power and
Agenda Setting
The questions of “who gets what, when and how” are definitional
of politics and crucial to governance, particularly in contested
policy areas where multiple interests are at play (Lasswell,
1936; Biermann et al., 2009). Such outcomes, in turn, depend
on who participates in decision-making procedures and under
what conditions. If land use governance is to address multiple
landscape functions, sectors and actors, decisions on who gets
included, how, and what comes onto the agenda are critical.
In the complexity of multifunctional and contested landscapes,
key questions are which issues are to be addressed, whose views
are taken into account, and what objectives and courses of
action are considered. Despite their relevance, however, these
political dimensions of landscape governance all too frequently
are overlooked or remain underexposed (Ros-Tonen et al., 2018).
The notion of inclusiveness arguably is at the core of
landscape approaches. Often it is taken to simply mean
multiplicity—of stakeholders, sectors, landscape functions—
without sufficient attention to those that are left out or
to structural imbalances amongst the ones included. Yet
inclusiveness presumes equitable participation in governance
and a focus on vulnerable stakeholders (Gupta et al., 2015).
It demands attention not only to poverty, but crucially
also to inequality in both its economic and political forms
(Rauniyar and Kanbur, 2009), as well as on the means to
empower marginalized actors (Cook, 2006). In practice, in
spite of its ambitious conceptual scope, a landscape approach
is unlikely to be all-inclusive; therefore, the quality of the
inclusiveness (or absence of) that it achieves is an important focus
of research.
One lens to analyze inclusiveness and the politics of landscape
governance is agenda-setting theory. Agenda setting refers on
a first level to “what to think about”, and on a second level
to “how to think about” issues or actors (Balmas and Sheafer,
2010). Situations are not tackled as issues to be addressed
unless their framing as problems is accepted (Kingdon, 1995;
Knaggard, 2015). Actors constantly frame issues in different
ways, attempting to influence perceptions, giving salience to
certain aspects at the expense of others, and strategically working
to shape the considerations that people take into account when
making judgements (Iyengar et al., 1982; see also Hajer, 1995).
Agenda-setting theory thus is concerned both with so-called
“object salience” (i.e., what or who gets the spotlight) and
“attribute salience” (i.e., what facets are presented, overlooked, or
emphasized) (McCombs et al., 1997; Balmas and Sheafer, 2010).
In such disputes, power imbalances play a major role.
According to Dahl (1957, p. 203), “A has power over B to
the extent that he can get B to do something that B wouldn’t
otherwise do.” However, as Bachrach and Baratz (1962, p. 948)
articulately put it, power relations can also be manifested
more subtly:
“Of course power is exercised when A participates in the making
of decisions that affect B. But power is also exercised when A
devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political
values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the
political process to public consideration of only those issues which
are comparatively innocuous to A. To the extent that A succeeds
in doing this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from
bringing to the fore any issues that might in their resolution be
seriously detrimental to A’s set of preferences.”
This relates precisely to power exercised in the form of agenda
setting and limiting the range of issues, actors, views, perspectives
or choices considered. It is responsible, for example, for the
exclusion of certain actors from decision-making processes, for
“non-decisions” on certain issues, and for overlooking certain
claims while perhaps overemphasizing others. This form of
power aims at shaping the structure of governance so as to lean
it toward certain outcomes, approaches and courses of action
while overlooking or downplaying alternatives (Barnett and
Finnemore, 1999). This is sometimes also described as structural
power, for power becomes institutionalized and engraved in
structural settings and designs that can, in turn, reinforce one’s
capabilities while limiting the range of action of other actors
(Clapp and Fuchs, 2009).
As landscape approaches in general—and CCLG in
particular—gain widespread attention and are increasingly
embraced, questions around what actually gets to be integrated,
how and by whom become fundamental. Besides their normative
dimension, they may also affect who wins and who loses from the
policies and courses of action adopted. Such questions arguably
become even more prominent in contexts of prevalent socio-
economic vulnerabilities and persistent historical inequalities,
as in much of the tropics, where the production of export
commodities and participation of foreign consumer actors in
land use governance also creates tensions (Bastos Lima and
Gupta, 2014).
BRAZILIAN SOY AND THE CERRADO
WORKING GROUP
Unfettered Soy and the Amazon Soy
Moratorium
Soy (Glycine max) has for the past decades been the flagship of
Brazil as an agribusiness powerhouse. In 2018, it surpassed the US
as the world’s largest producer and exporter of what has become
the world’s favorite protein crop, used primarily for animal
feed (Trase, 2018). Although soy started to be commercially
cultivated in Brazil only from the 20th century, it has quickly
overtaken sugarcane, coffee and other more traditional cash-
crops to become—by far—the country’s number one crop in
area, traded volumes, and export revenues (MAPA, 2019). Soy
cropland in Brazil leapt from 1.3 million hectares (Mha) in 1970
to over 35 Mha in 2018 (Trase, 2018; TNC, 2019). About 80%
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of that production is exported, mostly to China and Europe
(Trase, 2018).
While prominent from an economic viewpoint and serving to
meet growing global protein demand, soy expansion has raised
serious socio-environmental concerns. In addition to freshwater
and pesticide use, a major environmental impact from soy
expansion has been the clearing of natural vegetation, primarily
in the Amazon and Cerrado biomes (Gibbs et al., 2015; Rausch
et al., 2019), resulting in substantial carbon emissions and threats
to biodiversity (Green et al., 2019; Pendrill et al., 2019). About
two-fifths of Brazil’s 2016/2017 soy harvest—or 3.65 Mha—came
from lands cleared after 1999 (TNC, 2019). Such an expansion
often is accomplished through instances of land grabbing or
forceful—at times violent—acquisitions that exploit prevalent
tenure insecurity as well as corruption in Brazilian institutions
meant to safeguard land rights (Campbell, 2015, Sauer, 2018).
In the face of seemingly unfettered soy expansion, besides
the corpus of public policy enforced to combat deforestation
in Brazil since the 2000s (see Soares-Filho et al., 2014) the
main policy response to date has been the Amazon Soy
Moratorium. It followed an international outcry from the
increasing conversion of rainforest into soy monocultures,
best illustrated at the time by Greenpeace’s 2006 report
“Eating up the Amazon” (Greenpeace, 2006). A number of
major soy traders affiliated to Brazil’s largest sectoral industry
associations—the National Association of Cereal Exporters
(Associação Nacional dos Exportadores de Cereais—ANEC) and
the Brazilian Association of Vegetable Oil Industries (Associação
Brasileira de Indústrias de Óleos Vegetais—ABIOVE)—then
agreed not to source from areas deforested after a cutoff
date in the Amazon. That date was initially set for 2006 and
later updated to 2008. As those two agroindustry associations
together account for 80% of Brazil’s soy market (ABIOVE,
2018), the moratorium created a major positive bottleneck, and
a fledging form of CCLG anchored on soy started to emerge for
the Amazon.
Environmental NGOs partnering with the private sector then
set up a Soy Working Group (GTS), which later welcomed also
Brazilian government representatives, to monitor and govern
the implementation of the moratorium. It has set specific rules
and procedures (see GTS, 2019). First, a specialized company
(Agrosatélite, 2019) utilizes Brazil’s public land cover monitoring
data (via the PRODES system) to match deforestation and soy
cropland maps on the Amazon, identifying non-conforming
producers. Greenpeace, in collaboration with ABIOVE, then
creates a blacklist of suppliers from whom companies must
avoid sourcing. Lastly the NGOs, led by Imaflora, audit the
purchases of soy traders to verify compliance. The verification
is done for all municipalities with more than 5,000 ha of soy,
but monitoring covers only primary forest areas, not savanna
or other formations that exist within the Amazon. Protected
areas, indigenous territories and land reform settlements—which
sometimes do produce soy, though on a small scale—are also
excluded (GTS, 2019). The most controversial “blind spot,”
however, has been the issue of leakage, the perception that land
use change impacts may have been deflected to the neighboring
Cerrado landscape (Bastos Lima et al., 2019).
After a decade of the moratorium, cultivated soy area in the
Amazon quadrupled from 1.14 Mha in the 2006/2007 harvest
to 4.66 Mha in 2017/2018, but it expanded essentially over
pastures, and by the latter years only 1.4% of the soy produced
in the monitored Amazon municipalities did not conform to
the moratorium rules (GTS, 2019). Its governance setup also
continued to evolve, with the creation of three sub-groups on
dedicated themes: indirect impacts, land reform settlements, and
the Cerrado. In 2016, after continuous annual renewals, GTS
members finally agreed to make the mechanism permanent.
This is said to have freed up energy and focus to expand the
agenda1, and the Cerrado sub-group was then transformed into
the independent Cerrado Working Group (GTC) in 2018, with
its own set of participants, distinct governance structure and
goals. The point was not only to have a full-fledged forum on
the Cerrado, but also that if negotiations on this biome were
to fail, they would not compromise the Amazon moratorium’s
working success2.
The Cerrado Working Group
The Cerrado (Figure 1) is South America’s second largest biome,
a vast landscape of mostly wooded savanna vegetation that
harbors nearly 5,000 known endemic species and half of Brazil’s
freshwater resources outside the Amazon (Strassburg et al.,
2017). The Cerrado is also home to hundreds of traditional
communities, including indigenous peoples, quilombolas
(communities originally formed by Afro-Brazilian fugitive
slaves whose cultures and traditions have been maintained by
their descendants), and various other local groups identified
around particular livelihoods such as the women-only babassu
nutcrackers or the livestock-grazing Fecho de Pasto communities
(see ACCFC, 2017).
Despite its socio-ecological value, however, the Cerrado has
experienced faster deforestation than the Amazon, and it remains
significantly more vulnerable (Vieira et al., 2018). Whereas, 46%
of the Brazilian Amazon consists of public protected areas, that
figure is only 7.5% for the Cerrado (Strassburg et al., 2017); and
while Brazil’s Forest Code mandates that private rural properties
conserve at least 80% of the land as a Legal Reserve of native
vegetation in the Amazon, that requirement is of only 20–35% in
the Cerrado. As such, and although half of the original Cerrado
vegetation has been already lost, as much as 40% of what remains
could be legally cleared, even if this would disrupt several of its
ecosystem functions (Soares-Filho et al., 2014).
There is, therefore, a major need for halting both illegal
and legal deforestation in the Cerrado (Vieira et al., 2018).
Limiting soy expansion into native vegetation is key to doing
so, with more than 1.5 Mha of Cerrado vegetation cleared
directly for soy cultivation in the period 2003–2014 (Rausch
et al., 2019). Most of this clearing happened without infringing
the minimum Legal Reserve requirements, but soy expansion
also accounted for nearly 60% of all illegally cleared land in
the Cerrado. Soy-driven deforestation is particularly prominent
in the Matopiba region (Figure 1), where between a quarter
1Personal interviews in Brazil, 2018.
2Personal interviews in Brazil, 2018.
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FIGURE 1 | Map of Brazil showing the Cerrado biome (shaded in green) and soy cultivation in the Cerrado (shaded in yellow; crop year 2013–2014) (Agrosatélite,
2019). The states making up the Matopiba soy frontier in the Cerrado are also marked.
and half of Cerrado loss was directly due to soy (Rausch
et al., 2019). This region is also where much of the remaining
Cerrado land (both protected and unprotected) suitable for soy is
located (ibid).
Such a rapid loss of native vegetation is part of a broader
set of issues. Soil and water degradation, including through
pesticide contamination, have been prevalent in the Cerrado’s
soy-dominated areas (Hunke, 2015). Increasingly, land price
speculation and land assetization (i.e., utilization of land as
a financial asset) have also fueled land grabbing and rural
conflicts to the detriment particularly of local communities with
insecure tenure (FIAN International, 2018; see also Visser, 2015).
Soy expansion improves macroeconomic indicators but also
increases inequality in the Cerrado (Garrett and Rausch, 2016).
Violence and exclusion, in turn, have significantly contributed
to rural outmigration and local food security risks, as traditional
livelihoods are eroded and replaced by precarious living in city
outskirts (Favareto et al., 2019). In the words of a representative
from a grassroots’ organization in Matopiba, “They destroy our
livelihoods and then complain that we don’t want to work and just
depend on cash transfers and social assistance.”3
Only recently has the Cerrado gained more international
prominence, but sustainability concerns around its use and
fledgling forms of landscape governance have long been in
place. At the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, civil society—including
grassroots organizations from local communities and indigenous
groups—created the Cerrado Network (Rede Cerrado) for joint
advocacy and action. They also signed the Cerrados Treaty,
unusually named in the plural to acknowledge local diversities.
The document diagnosed major environmental issues to be
addressed and set a common action plan for concerned actors.
Its objectives included the creation of new protected areas,
3Personal interviews in Brazil, 2018.
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TABLE 1 | Members of the Cerrado Working Group (GTC)a.
Actor type (as classified in the GTC) Members
Industry Brazilian Association of Vegetable Oil Industries (ABIOVE) | ADM | Amaggi | National Association of Cereal
Exporters (ANEC) | Bunge | Cargill | COFCO | Glencore | Louis Dreyfus Company
Civil society Earth Innovation Institute | Greenpeace | Institute of Management and Forest and Agricultural Certification
(Imaflora) | Amazon Environmental Research Institute (IPAM) | TNC | WWF
Producer organizations Association of Farmers and Irrigators of Bahia (AIBA) | Brazilian Association of Soy Producers (Aprosoja) | Brazilian
Rural Society (SRB)
Governmental and financial institutions Banco do Brasil, INPE, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Environment, Brazilian Forest Service
Consumer goods Carrefour, Walmart
aThis list comprises the actors invited to integrate the GTC and considered members, irrespective of actual meeting attendance.
further recognition of indigenous and customary land rights, as
well as the promotion of agroecological farming for sustainable
development of the Cerrado (Cerrados Treaty, 1992). These
calls were reinforced in 1999 by a charter of principles of the
Cerrado Network, which as of 2020 included over 300 civil
society organizations and continued to work as an umbrella
for initiatives on socio-environmental conservation and/or local
economic development (see Rede Cerrado, 2020).
It was against this backdrop that the Cerrado Manifesto
came to fruition, a document that would ultimately trigger the
creation of the Cerrado Working Group (GTC). Launched on
11 September 20174 by a group of 60 civil society organizations
in Brazil (including large environmental NGOs, indigenous
peoples’ associations and academia), the manifesto recollects the
Cerrado’s underrated environmental importance and calls for
immediate public and private action toward its conservation
and sustainable development (Cerrado Manifesto, 2017). That
year had seen the publication of the first PRODES Cerrado
data showing that its deforestation was 50% higher than the
Amazon’s (Observatório do Clima, 2017). Moreover, the market-
liberal Temer administration had taken power and many NGOs
foresaw little willingness from the government to strengthen
conservation efforts. A push was thus perceived as imperative,
including for private sector initiatives5. The publication of the
manifesto, in turn, led several multinational food companies to
respond with a Cerrado Statement of Support (SOS), endorsing
its goals, pledging to eliminate deforestation from their (soy)
supply chains, and committing to work together with Brazilian
civil society toward commonly-agreed solutions.6
The GTC was thus composed in late 2017 and launched
in 2018 with the aim of coming to an agreement for Cerrado
conservation already by the end of the year (GTC, 2018a). It
presented two important novelties when compared to the older
GTS. First, participation was broadened to include government
actors from the start, as well as consumer goods representatives
4September 11 is, since 2003, the National Cerrado Day in Brazil. The date
was chosen for being the birthday of Ary Oliveira (1931–2011, more known in
Brazil by his nickname Ary Pára-Raios, or Ary “Lightning Rod”), journalist, street
artist, and socio-environmental activist who embraced these causes in the Cerrado
even during the repressive years of Brazil’s military dictatorship (1964–1985). See
https://www.xapuri.info/meio-ambiente/11-setembro-dia-nacional-do-cerrado/.
5Personal interviews in Brazil, 2018.
6See https://cerradostatement.fairr.org.
and soy farmer associations (see Table 1). An independent
facilitator was also hired for the meetings. As an agribusiness
farmer representative put it, “The [soy farming] sector used
to be hostage to requirements without ever participating in the
discussions. In the soy moratorium for the Amazon, for example,
we were not represented7” This may be a second thought from
some in the sector, whose farmer associations at the time refused
to become involved in the Amazon moratorium and continue to
mostly protest against it (Aprosoja, 2018).
Second, the GTC is not only more inclusive, but it has also
explored a greater diversity of policy options than the GTS.While
the latter focuses exclusively on the Amazon Soy Moratorium,
the GTC has devoted energies to public policy implementation
as well as to designing additional instruments. It created three
dedicated sub-groups on: (1) Territorial Intelligence, to identify
vulnerable Cerrado areas and options for deforestation-free soy
expansion; (2) Incentives, to develop a system of payments for
conservation and consider other market-based and financial
instruments (e.g., “green bonds,” credit, impact investments);
and (3) Public Governance, to monitor the implementation of
existing public policy on the Cerrado, such as the Forest Code’s
requirements on farms’ Legal Reserves, validate their insertion
on the government’s rural environmental registry (CAR), and
consider new public policies, particularly a national zoning policy
for soy akin to what Brazil developed for sugarcane and oil palm,
determining go and no-go areas (GTC, 2018b).
After a year of work, soy zoning remains an elusive goal—
as has most environmental policy engagement with the Federal
Government under the Bolsonaro administration8. Coordination
with sub-national public policies in Cerrado states, however,
such as Mato Grosso’s PCI initiative for comprehensive land-
use planning and local development, or Maranhão’s flagship
Mais IDH program and its actions on smallholder farming, land
tenure and local food security, has also been limited. Rather, the
GTC’s scope has focused mostly on public policy compliance by
the soy industry, deforestation-free expansion, and incentives to
(soy) farmers.
The main focus of GTC negotiations has come to be on two
parallel agreements to be signed in tandem and with expected
7Personal interview in Brazil, 2018.
8An illustration of its position, Bolsonaro’s government inNovember 2019 revoked
the 10-years old zoning policy for sugarcane.
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TABLE 2 | Sustainability agendas for the Cerrado over time.
Issues Cerrados Treaty (1992)a Cerrado working group (2018/2019)
Inclusiveness Promotion of local actor participation in planning and policy development Governance led by major environmental NGOs
and the soy sector
Domestic collaboration Creation of a permanent network of NGOs and social movements
International collaboration Articulation with societies of all countries where Cerrado-like or savanna
ecosystems exist
Engagement with soy buyers in developed
countries
Awareness raising Change the institutionalized view that the Cerrado does not offer resources
for the survival of humanity
Payments for conservation of native vegetation
in soy farms
Legal recognition Recognition of the Cerrado as national heritageb, of the same status of the
Amazon and other ecosystems
–
Reorientation of finance Reorientation of international finance that has been incentivizing and making
viable the implementation of elitist and predatory occupation projects
Financial instruments to direct soy cropland
expansion away from native vegetation and
preferably onto already cleared areas (e.g.,
pasturelands)
Protected areas Creation of new protected areas with remaining native Cerrado vegetation —
Sustainable development and
smallholder agriculture
Sustainable development in the Cerrado, prioritizing small-scale production —
Land distribution Land reform and smallholder-oriented agricultural policy —
Indigenous land rights Demarcation and protection of indigenous lands —
Creation of institutional channels Permanent bridging mechanisms with the Brazilian Parliament Participation of government actors in the GTC
Ecosystem regeneration Reforestation programmes with native species in degraded areas or areas
of importance to water resources
Restoration of legal reserve areas within soy
farms
aAlthough translated from Portuguese into English, the original wording of the document has been maintained as much as possible. These 12 points are explicitly organized as such in
the Cerrados Treaty.
bBrazil’s Constitution (1988) enshrines the Amazon and other biomes as national heritage, but not the Cerrado.
support mainly from European demand-side actors (GTC, 2019).
The first one, conditional on the second, is a conversion-
free sourcing policy for the Cerrado akin to the Amazon Soy
Moratorium. (The term “moratorium” is, however, avoided as
it would suggest a contingent temporary mechanism, besides
striking a negative chord among Brazilian soy farmers)9. As
in the Amazon, soy traders affiliated to ABIOVE and ANEC,
which together comprise about 80% of the market also in the
Cerrado (Trase, 2017), would refrain from sourcing from areas
cleared after a cutoff date to be set. The second agreement is the
creation of a payment scheme for conservation of surplus native
Cerrado vegetation (additional to the minimum Legal Reserve
requirements) in soy farms. Signatories of theCerrado SOSwould
fund it via a joint mechanism to be established, targeting soy
farmers who hold vegetation clearing permits, and initially for
a period of 5 years (GTC, 2019). Jointly, the agreements are
sometimes referred to as the Cerrado Conservation Mechanism
(Byrne, 2019). Proponents argue that “this has an important
narrative element to it, because we are suddenly speaking of
restrictions and advantages, not only yet more restrictions10.
Key questions, however, remain on issues such as permanence,
sufficiency of funds to compensate all (or most) applicants,
and fairness.
Table 2 summarizes how the current GTC agenda compares
to the broader one of the Cerrados Treaty, which remains a core
9This communications rationale was clear and consensual among all interviewed
stakeholders.
10Personal interviews in Brazil, 2018.
reference for advocacy from the Cerrado Network. The list of
issues draws from the contents of that landmark document.
ANALYSIS: CERRADO AGENDA SETTING
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
First-Level Agenda Setting: From
Sustainable Development to Sustainable
Supply Chains
As evident from Table 2, the focus of the Cerrado’s sustainability
agenda has changed substantially over the years, becoming
significantly narrower and skewed toward private-sector
interests. Grassroots organizations and Brazilian NGOs who
initiated such advocacy have had a broad focus, inclusive
of indigenous peoples’ rights, land issues and sustainable
development, with clear attention to social equity and small-scale
farming. Such smallholder and indigenous calls, however, have
been increasingly sidelined, as have other goals more directly
related to public policy (e.g., creation of more protected areas).
Although the Cerrado’s growing international prominence has
served to attract funding for broad sustainability work, such as
by the Critical Ecosystems Partnership Fund (see Sawyer et al.,
2017), the GTC agenda and most attention have been on “the
expansion of soy without deforestation in the Cerrado” (GTC,
2018b), a goal that some actors then dub as being equivalent
to “sustainable” soy (see, e.g., TNC, 2019). This focus addresses
primarily the interests and concerns of export markets, and
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it offers an illustration of what has been called “the trade-
ification of the food sustainability agenda,” whereby international
commodity trade has come to dominate agri-food sustainability
discussions at the expense of other concerns (Clapp, 2017). It
represents predominantly the narratives and particular goals of
soy producers and demand-side actors in consumer countries,
including their choices of what sustainability issues to address
and of how to address them.
In the Cerrado case, the explanation for such a narrowed
agenda is two-fold. First, potential funders of the proposed
payment mechanism—and soy consumers in general—are not
sufficiently concerned about the vulnerable socio-economic
status of local communities, but seemingly exclusively with
conserving native vegetation. As a soy trader representative in
Brazil has put it, “NGOs put some pressure, but the ones who
really pressure are the consumers, if they threaten not to buy from
you anymore”11. Buyers are the ones who have real teeth, but
their concern is limited, and they also have vested interests in
the continuation of (cheap) soy production for supplying their
livestock farming systems.
Second, the GTC agenda reflects the priorities, views and
interests of its members. The group is composed mostly of—
and is led by—soy supply chain and large environmental NGO
actors, whose representatives co-chair all the sub-groups. Hence,
the focus has been on private governance initiatives such as
market-based instruments to be used among soy-chain actors,
to the exclusion of non-participants and resulting in limited
coordination with public policies but the Forest Code and
its requirements on private farms. Likewise, transformative
initiatives for radically different land use in the Cerrado,
such as through agroecology, support for more diverse small-
scale agriculture or uptake of other crops therefore are not
under consideration. Prevailing agenda setters clearly exclude
issues whose recognition as problems would be detrimental
to them, such as questions on increasing pesticide use, water
consumption, agrobiodiversity loss, or social exclusion and
concentration of land ownership. Meanwhile, the actors who
would raise such issues and push for more equitable allocation
of incentives are not part of that governance process. They are
not represented, nor are their concerns and views.
Such a narrow focus is not for lack of awareness: NGOs
in the Cerrado have long been vocal about various socio-
environmental issues and the need for action (see Sawyer
and Lahsen, 2016). Rather, it is the manifestation of sheer
power asymmetries, giving salience to the issues that interest
dominant stakeholders while downplaying others. Even within
the existing GTC agenda, the leverage from the soy sector
is clearly manifested through the emphasis on mere legality
and compliance, in addition to land-use planning centered
around assessing suitability for soy, opportunity costs and
financial compensations (exclusively) for soy farmers. As a senior
government official in a Matopiba state assesses, “soy farmers
show their privileged power position when they manage to get
these compensations for preserving the Cerrado”12. An agenda of
11Personal interviews in Brazil, 2018.
12Personal interviews in Brazil, 2018.
sustainable development for the Cerrado has thus morphed into
one of “sustainable” supply chains, with important implications
that often remain overlooked.
Second-Level Agenda Setting: Issue
Framing and Attribute Salience
Agenda-setting efforts have gone beyond the mere selection of
what issues to address and what to ignore. They also involve a
second, more nuanced level related to attribute salience.
First, the GTC has been part of a deft effort to make salient the
Cerrado’s attributes as a carbon sink, as a biodiversity hotspot,
and its climate-regulating functions with impacts on soy yields
(see TNC, 2019). These ecological attributes have effectively
worked to construe a “compelling argument” for its conservation,
i.e., highlighting “certain characteristics [that] may resonate
with the public in such a way” that object salience increases
(McCombs, 2014, p.73). Such features have arguably helped
bring the Cerrado into international spotlight. This, however,
begs the question of “compelling to whom?,” and the answers
on whose concerns dominate the agenda and who holds power
promptly appear. When the first funding pledges—by European
buyers—for Cerrado conservation were announced in December
2019, along with celebratory remarks by feed companies and soy
farmers alike, those biophysical features were indeed the ones
highlighted, underscoring the rationale for payments (Byrne,
2019). Nowhere were to be seen the perspectives of local
communities, who clearly cannot maintain their livelihoods
within patches of Cerrado scattered within individual private
soy farms.
The GTC thus puts forth a slim interpretation of
sustainability, concerned exclusively with the preservation of
native vegetation. It implicitly embraces a land sparing paradigm,
based on a separation between production and conservation
land uses, and follows typical wildlife-oriented Northern
environmentalism, as opposed to varieties that incorporate
social equity at the core (Clapp and Dauvergne, 2005; Martinez-
Alier, 2014). In this way, the Cerrado’s sustainability agenda
has become more set by the views, preferences and concerns
of foreign actors (buyers, traders, and largely biodiversity-
focused North-based environmental NGOs) than by those of
domestic stakeholders, including vulnerable ones who have their
traditional livelihoods impaired, such as women groups (e.g.,
babassu nutcrackers) or indigenous peoples.
Second, the GTC agenda acknowledges soy as the only
development path considered for the Cerrado. Once again,
certain attributes are highlighted in order to work as compelling
arguments that increase the sector’s overall salience. For this
purpose, food security and development are strategically framed.
Although the GTC does not discuss food security per se, the
argument of feeding a growing global population is routinely
used by soy growers and the soy industry to legitimize their
expansion13 (Oliveira and Hecht, 2016), and major NGOs
corroborate such views by speaking of Cerrado lands “needed”
for soy—while acknowledging such needs from no-one else
(TNC, 2019, p.2). There is a clear contrast between how global
13Personal interviews in Brazil, 2018.
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food security is emphasized while local food security is largely
overlooked. Moreover, through the salience of global supply
availability to the detriment of other food security dimensions,
the soy sector itself also becomes strategically salient, being
presented as a valuable and legitimate industry in spite of all
the social and environmental grievances that many Cerrado
stakeholders leverage against it.
Similar legitimacy is conferred to soy as the choice engine of
regional development in the Cerrado, to be balanced only against
conservation interests. Attributes such as soy’s contribution
to economic growth, or its correlation with higher Human
Development Indexes14 in Cerrado municipalities, are taken as
evidence of a socially beneficial role (see Martinelli et al., 2017).
Its skewed distribution of benefits and burdens that augments
inequality (Garrett and Rausch, 2016) is generally overlooked,
as are socioeconomic attributes on which soy underperforms
when compared to other agricultural land uses (e.g., fruit and
vegetable crops in Brazil create 25 times more direct and
indirect jobs per hectare than soy does15; CNA Abrafrutas, 2018).
Unfavorable attributes are tactically omitted, alternatives are
tacitly ignored, and soy is treated for all practical purposes as the
only development path on the agenda.
Considerations on Payments for
Conservation in the Cerrado
The above concerns regarding the salience of soy producer and
consumer interests in the GTC, resulting in a narrow focus on
soy-driven deforestation, are clearly manifested in the key focus
of its deliberations: the establishment of a system for monetary
compensation for soy farmers conserving native vegetation in
the Cerrado, which would serve to make the establishment of a
moratorium on further Cerrado clearing for soy tenable.
Actor views on this GTC agenda have varied significantly.
Many Cerrado soy farmers have welcomed the announcement of
payments (see Byrne, 2019), with ABIOVE and major soy traders
being firm defenders both of the Amazon moratorium and of
GTC negotiations (Girardi, 2018). However, there have also been
strong critics that have chosen to leave the GTC, for different
reasons. Aprosoja, Brazil’s main soy farmer association, walked
out of the negotiations already in early 2018 due to unwillingness
to even consider another moratorium on legal deforestation16
(see Aprosoja, 2018). Then in October 2018 Greenpeace also left
the GTC, due to concerns over the fairness and environmental
integrity of the payments proposition.
Although the details of this Cerrado scheme (e.g., regarding
exact payment levels) are still being negotiated, it resembles a
system of payments for ecosystem services (PES), even without
explicit service valuation. Payments would be available for a
contract period of 5 years, and only to farmers with land suitable
for soy and with native vegetation cover that could be legally
cleared (i.e., having native vegetation in excess of the minimum
14The Human Development Index is a composite indicator of per capita income,
life expectancy, and formal education.
15Fruit crops in Brazil do have, however, other issues such as pesticide poisoning
Faria et al., 2009.
16Personal interviews in Brazil, 2018.
Legal Reserve requirement, as well as holding a clearing permit)
(GTC, 2019). Through this design, the scheme would target those
actors most likely to deforest in the absence of compensation,
something that has been shown to increase PES additionality
(Persson and Alpízar, 2013; Börner et al., 2017).
However, while targeting payments can potentially increase
the additionality of such a PES-like scheme, it also raises
a number of concerns in terms of the program’s broader
effectiveness. First, by making payments eligible only for
clearing-permit holders, the proposed scheme creates a perverse
incentive for famers with Legal Reserve surpluses to apply for
such permits in order to secure payments for abstaining to
use them. That the proposed scheme could create a rush for
vegetation clearing permits, unduly capitalizing rich soy farmers
that then would have no obligation to maintain the conserved
vegetation after 5 years, was a key reason given by Greenpeace
for walking out of GTC negotiations in 2018.17
This risk is especially worrying given the short timeframe
for the initial contracts, which means that if payments are
discontinued, conserved vegetation could soon face a higher
risk of clearing (i.e., so-called temporal spillovers; see Bastos
Lima et al., 2019). While some stakeholders in our interviews
argued that PES, even if temporary, would suffice to motivate
soy farmers to regard native vegetation as economic assets worth
preserving (or, in other words, that the initial payments are a way
to buy support for the Cerrado conversion moratorium), theory
and empirical evidence would suggest the opposite (Börner
et al., 2017). There is a growing literature on how payments
affect motivations for conservation (Rode et al., 2015; Ezzine-
de-Blas et al., 2019). Empirical studies suggest that in contexts
of social conflict—as the Cerrado—PES is likely to undermine
environmental outcomes over time through the crowding out of
intrinsic motivations18, especially where payments are perceived
to strengthen pre-existing power inequalities and contribute to
unfair distribution of conservation costs and benefits (Costedoat
et al., 2016; Chervier et al., 2019). There is also anecdotal evidence
of farmers in Mesoamerica threatening to cut their forests if
payments were discontinued (Kaimowitz, 2008).
Notably, motivation crowding may not only affect PES
participants, but also agents left out, potentially leading to
spillovers and reduced overall effectiveness (Bastos Lima et al.,
2019). In the case of the proposed scheme, there are two
groups of concern: Amazon soy farmers and non-soy landowners
(including local communities) in the Cerrado. The former
might—justifiably—ask why they are expected to freely abstain
from legal clearing while their neighbors in the Cerrado get
compensation to do the same, an argument already heard from
soy industry representatives19. Similarly, while the design of the
proposed scheme aims to maximize additionality by targeting
17See https://www.greenpeace.org/brasil/blog/greenpeace-deixa-o-grupo-de-
trabalho-do-cerrado/.
18Even if intrinsic conservation motivations are probably low among many actors
in the Cerrado (judging by the landscape’s high deforestation rate), antipathy
to conservation can still increase. According to the cited literature, the baseline
of intrinsic motivation is irrelevant for the argument; what matters is whether
payments will shift this baseline toward more or less support to conservation.
19Personal interviews in Brazil, 2018.
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agents who are “if not outright environmentally nasty, then at
least at the edge of becoming so” (Wunder, 2007, p. 53), it also
raises issues of fairness and equity with respect to traditional
communities or less capitalized farmers not eligible for payments.
There is experimental evidence that this type of targeting of
payments can lead to motivation crowding and retaliation also
among those excluded (Alpízar et al., 2017a,b), suggesting that
a disregard for issues of equity may undermine PES credibility
and ecosystem service provision in the long run (Corbera and
Pascual, 2012; Pascual et al., 2014), leading to a loss in overall
effectiveness due to spillovers.
These concerns have been highlighted by actors who have
never been invited to join the GTC, such as most grassroots
organizations. They have wondered why traditional communities
and other Cerrado dwellers, who have been much better at
conserving its vegetation, are not eligible to receive payments20.
These actors generally are also poorer and in greater need of
economic support. They have been critical of how a broad and
inclusive Cerrado sustainability agenda has been reduced to only
a few points of interest to the soy industry or to environmentally
concerned buyers in Europe. It illustrates the GTC’s detachment
from local agendas. In the view of a senior policymaker in a
Matopiba state, “This thing of PES is mostly for large companies,
this carbon thing. What we are hoping to do is [promote] greater
awareness on environmental values and linking it to food security,
besides promoting things like agroforestry with cocoa and coffee21.”
As noted by one senior Brazilian researcher interviewed: “It
is the exact same dilemma that happened to REDD+: Do you
address only the large farmer that was going to deforest and not
the indigenous person who has always conserved? The idea of
jurisdictional REDD+ came up precisely because of that, for the
sake of benefit sharing22.” The challenge in this case is that the
landscape approach taken by the GTC does not match a political
jurisdiction that could potentially address benefit sharing, and so
far this is an issue that has not figured prominently neither in the
GTC deliberations in general nor in the specific discussions on
the payments scheme. In the view of a local socioenvironmental
organization in another Matopiba state:
“Regularizing traditional peoples and their communities is the
best way to conserve the Cerrado. As to PES, its internal logic
is problematic and very different from that of local peoples. It
implicitly obliges people to embrace that mercantile logic. They
should get policies that help them out in their ways of life, like with
REDD+ in Acre23.”
In the GTC, although many are pragmatically positive about
securing deforestation-free soy, some NGO representatives
resent directing so much energy to such a soy-centered agenda,
and that the industry may be using their expertise to measure
how much extra it can get and quantify opportunity costs
20Personal interviews in Brazil, 2018.
21Personal interviews in Brazil, 2018.
22Personal interviews in Brazil, 2018.
23For an assessment of REDD+ implementation in Acre, see (Bastos Lima et al.,
2017).
to be compensated. Some felt they may have been “slow-
cooked” by an agroindustry sector with little appetite for
genuine transformations24. Indeed, even some Forest Code
devices for private farms remain overlooked, such as farmers’
little-publicized option to change the legal status of surplus
Legal Reserve areas into so-called “environmental servitude,”
which would lock their conservation status for a period of
15 years or longer and potentially help address permanence
concerns (see Brazil, 2012, Art.79). Clearly, not only the range
of acknowledged issues but also the mechanisms of choice are
subject to agenda setting.
DISCUSSION: CCLG AS AN EVOLVING
FORMAT
CCLG has evolved to become an important approach to address
deforestation. The GTC, as its newest instance in Brazil, offers
many lessons on the evolution of this governance format.
As the GTS before it and also the Sustainable Livestock
Working Group (Grupo de Trabalho da Pecuária Sustentável)
on beef in the Amazon, these initiatives emerged out of
a perception of insufficiency from public policy to deter
detrimental land use changes. Over the years, although the
focus has remained on deforestation-free production of specific
agricultural commodities, the portfolio of policy instruments has
increased substantially. From an initial limitation to moratoria
implemented by traders, CCLG in its latest incarnation as the
GTC has come to discuss a variety of market-based instruments
such as payments for conservation and green finance, as well
as advocacy for and implementation of public policy under
the umbrella of Brazil’s Forest Code. This inductive analysis
of the GTC therefore allows also for identifying strengths and
weaknesses of the format thus far.
Landscape specificity has allowed CCLG to consider more
creative policy instruments (beyond the usual and elusive
rationale of premium prices) and be more tangible than
conventional roundtables in changing realities on the ground.
The Amazon Soy Moratorium has done more to reduce soy-
driven deforestation than existing certification schemes have
(Gibbs et al., 2015; Van der Ven et al., 2018). Such a specificity
has also allowed actors to interweave new instruments in the
existing framework of public policies, promote policy coherence,
and address particular (perceived) vulnerabilities of a landscape.
In the Cerrado case, this is clear from the identification of its
vulnerability to legal deforestation and the tailoring of GTC
policy instruments to that landscape’s specific Legal Reserve
requirements and the need for vegetation clearing permits, which
may become a condition for receiving payments under the
compensation scheme being devised.
Commodity specificity, in turn, has on the one hand allowed
for addressing face-front a relevant driver of land use change,
unlike broad jurisdictional approaches that sometimes devise
end-of-pipe solutions with little impact in the face of outside
driving forces (such as in REDD+; see Bastos Lima et al.,
24Personal interviews in Brazil, 2018.
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2017) or other general landscape governance initiatives that do
not engage with a given sector as much. CCLG, rather, takes
a focused approach and brings various supply chain actors to
the negotiation table—even those that do not belong to the
landscape but whose decisions influence it, such as consumers
and investors. This means acknowledging and starting to target
the important teleconnections that may exist between land
systems and faraway food systems (Meyfroidt et al., 2019). This
advantage of commodity specificity has also been observed in the
G4 and MPF-TAC cattle agreements for beef from the Amazon
(Gibbs et al., 2016).
On the other hand, issues of indirect land-use change and
deforestation leakage remain unaddressed—as observed also
in the cattle agreements (see Alix-Garcia and Gibbs, 2017).
Soy-driven displacement of pastures into native vegetation
is a major persistent issue in Brazil (Arima et al., 2011).
Moreover, bringing powerful supply chain actors on board
has proven ambivalent, as their particular views and values
have shown to disproportionately influence the landscape’s
agenda setting—while enjoying greater legitimization through
such a multi-stakeholder process (see Schouten and Glasbergen,
2011). Some NGO representatives in the GTC felt that their
advocacy, personnel and finance-acquisition capacity have
been hijacked to serve the soy industry’s “legality plus PES”
agenda25. The emphasis on conversion-free soy has resulted in
limited attention to other environmental issues, or to broader
socioeconomic development needs perceived as key for landscape
conservation—and accommodated in jurisdictional initiatives
such as Mato Grosso’s PCI and Acre’s REDD+ program, where
governments play a role in benefit sharing (see Bastos Lima
et al., 2017; Arvor et al., 2018). This shortage of attention to
broader social issues may be particularly critical in cases of
highly concentrated commodity sectors that involve relatively
few people, such as soy.
As a proverbial double-edged sword, which has advantages
but also carries significant and sometimes not-so-obvious risks,
CCLG is an ambivalent governance format with certain strengths
but also particular risks to be managed. There is a clear contrast
between the variety of tools it employs and the narrow agenda
it discusses. CCLG may therefore serve to address the concerns
of dominant players, but risks leaving unaddressed various other
environmental and social concerns from other actors who have
different understandings of what landscape governance should
accomplish. Broader sustainable development goals likely remain
elusive. CCLG thus brings inherent tensions to conservationists,
as it risks becoming too oriented to and by the dynamics of
the selected anchor commodity and its key actors—discussing
primarily the favored approaches, accepted views, preferred
instruments and courses of action of the targeted sector.
Importantly, the example of the payment scheme proposed for
the Cerrado suggests that, if the scope of the policies considered
becomes too narrow (and is, therefore, perceived as unfair), the
legitimacy of the landscape-level initiative as a whole (in that
case, the GTC) may suffer. We posit that a balance may need
25Personal interviews in Brazil, 2018.
to be maintained between CCLG’s supply chain “anchoring” and
broader landscape concerns for it to attract large stakeholder
support, but this clearly needs further research.
Using GTC examples to illustrate, Table 3 summarizes some
of the format’s strengths and weaknesses (broadly from the
normative standpoint of inclusiveness and sustainability), on the
basis of its hybrid features that make it narrower than most
landscape approaches but broader than typical supply chain
sustainability initiatives. The derivation of those characteristics
is inductive, on the basis of features that stood out in this
empirical case.
Whether CCLG’s strengths and weaknesses indeed constitute
necessary trade-offs or not remains an object of research. That
should not be assumed to be a zero-sum game, lest it become a
convenient excuse for the ones involved to explain the exclusion
of others under the guise of being allegedly more effective in
achieving environmental goals. As the cases of PES illustrate,
there can be positive correlations between inclusiveness and
conservation effectiveness. What our analysis shows is that the
narrowing of the Cerrado sustainability agenda is borne out of
power relations in setting the agenda, not out of necessity.
Furthermore, as much as CCLG results from prevailing power
relations, it will also affect them in return. To the extent that
some participants make use of structural power, they further
entrench their relatively dominant positions in that setting unless
checkered by norms of inclusive and equitable governance. If not,
CCLG risks deepening inequalities, vulnerabilities, and exclusion
if only the interests of already powerful actors are negotiated.
The mere participation in such instances of governance may
already boost the legitimacy of participant actors while further
obscuring others.
Finally, a key remaining question is whether—and how—
CCLG may work as an entry point for more comprehensive,
integrated landscape governance. Clearly, more inclusive
landscape governance is unlikely to spontaneously arise. In
the Cerrado case, agribusiness still commands substantive
political and economic leverage. These strong players
deliberately avoid changes that could disrupt the dominant
agenda hinged on increasing soy supplies. As such, unless
there is major political change in Brazil, the likeliest route—
reinforced by the CCLG format—is swaying demand-side
players toward more comprehensive requirements. As soy-
consumer concerns for the Cerrado suddenly rose and
have quickly been able to influence the governance of that
landscape, more may happen if such environmental concerns
are more meaningfully translated into action while also
expanded to include other sustainability issues such as
land rights or water access, or to demand the involvement
of other stakeholders. Similarly, the GTC strength would
also increase if European companies were joined by other
major soy buyers, such as Chinese ones. Clearly, much of
CCLG’s effectiveness relies on demand-side readiness to
foster changes through different carrots and sticks (e.g.,
targeted funding, selection against bad practices, preferential
purchasing), broaden their agenda, and act responsibly on
the basis of the power they hold over faraway landscapes and
their people (see Munroe et al., 2019).
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TABLE 3 | Summary of CCLG’s hybrid features.
Governance features Implications GTC examples
Takes on drivers, focusing on an
anchor commodity
Strengths: Engages a key driver of change, in place of
end-of-pipe solutions. Clearer understanding of what it takes to
shift current patterns. Focus may increase likelihood of consensus.
A setting for reaching compromises and negotiated solutions
acceptable to that industry.
−
Weaknesses: May overlook other drivers. Leakage and indirect
land-use change may still require attention. Actors that drive land
use change get disproportionate agenda-setting power. Focus on
a key driver may have trade-offs with the multi-sector and
multi-actor ideal of the landscape approach; more radical actors
are likely to be excluded.
Focus on soy as a key driver of land use
change in the Cerrado. Soy traders playing key
governance roles both in rule-making and
implementation, given their market leverage to
enforce decisions.
Engages influential actors from
outside the landscape
Strengths: Tackles key food system interactions with the land
system, including influences from remote demand-side actors.
Room for cooperation with consumers and investors whose
decisions affect the landscape.
−
Weaknesses: Outsiders may come to have more authority in
landscape governance than local actors who have higher stakes
but less power.
Engagement with Cerrado SOS signatories
(soy processors and retailers) to fund payments
for conservation and avoid legal deforestation
Includes landscape actors
beyond the anchor commodity’s
supply chain
Strengths: Potentially broadens the issues, concerns,
perspectives and resources beyond those of supply chain actors,
resulting in greater legitimacy, implementation capacity, and
agreement on actions to be taken.
−
Weaknesses: Greater inclusiveness may reduce consensus and
make compromises harder to achieve. May still fall short of
inclusiveness for more marginalized groups.
Public monitoring and enforcement (PRODES
Cerrado) joined by NGOs’ expertise and private
sector capacity
Accounts for landscape-specific
environmental issues and
vulnerabilities
Strengths: Can address public regulation gaps, especially around
undesirable but legal impacts. Possibly easier than modifying laws.
−
Weaknesses: Limited external validity or applicability of policy
lessons beyond that landscape.
Focus on the Cerrado’s particular vulnerability
to legal deforestation
Tailors policy instruments to the
landscape’s existing institutional
setting
Strengths: Builds upon and seeks synergies with existing public
policies, possibly filling gaps. Easier policy coherence and more
variety of instruments than only certification and premium prices.
−
Weaknesses: Limited diffusion and replicability of policy lessons,
as instruments are tailored to the context.
Rules and incentives drawn based on Legal
Reserve and clearing-license requirements.
CONCLUSIONS
Innovative landscape governance initiatives have come into play
in the face of persistent inability to rein in the expansion of
industrial monocultures over native ecosystems in the tropics. In
Brazil, a decade of experience with the Amazon Soy Moratorium
led to the creation of the GTC, arguably the latest example of
an initiative type that combines both a landscape focus and
targeted supply chain governance to address face-front some key
drivers of land use change. We have conceptualized that hybrid
governance format as CCLG, which generally involves public and
private actors, the tailoring of private policy to public regulations,
as well as attention to the particular vulnerabilities of a landscape
and the contingencies of supply chain actors.
The GTC case illustrates the format’s strengths and
achievements as much as its limitations and pitfalls. Through its
comprehensive approach—from identification of deforestation
hotspots, to devising compensation mechanisms, and supporting
public environmental regulatory frameworks—the GTC has
been broader than any private certification initiative. By
negotiating with demand-side signatories of the Cerrado SOS,
it has also gone farthest in seeking to address drivers of change
and promoting international collaboration for conserving
that landscape. However, the GTC does not escape the grips
of existing power imbalances, but rather reproduces them.
Although CCLG would in principle have allowed for greater
inclusiveness, the GTC has pursued essentially a narrow agenda
of deforestation-free soy expansion that does not match broader
sustainable development goals for the Cerrado, nor does it
respond to the pleas of its most vulnerable stakeholders. The soy
agroindustry thus succeeds in avoiding consideration of thorny
issues such as agrobiodiversity loss, unequal freshwater access,
pesticide contamination or land rights. It is counterbalanced
not by the local demands of those who are impacted, but
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only by the (limited) environmental concerns of distant
consumers, as represented by consumer good companies and
international NGOs. The proposed payments scheme thus
does not broadly address the needs of Cerrado stakeholders
but is rather a product of the agendas of soy traders and
international NGOs represented. Its limited focus may increase
the additionality of payments, but it may also undermine overall
effectiveness (through increased spillover risks) and the GTC’s
perceived legitimacy.
In sum, our analysis shows that CCLG is a double-edged
sword, for while it has advantages over less focused initiatives,
the governance process and its agenda risk being captured by
sectoral interests, sidelining more marginal landscape actors.
The GTC could potentially become an entry point for more
comprehensive landscape governance in the Cerrado, but only
if there is pressure for attention to broader sustainability issues
and greater inclusiveness. Further research may investigate
how comparable CCLG initiatives may be surfacing in other
contexts, such as in other countries or in relation to other
commodities. Case study comparisons to assess variation
between commodities (e.g., more export-dependent vs. those
which are more domestically consumed) could be particularly
yielding. Finally, there is a clear role for science to inform
landscape governance initiatives more systematically, providing
not only spatial analyses and the natural-science basis for
decisions, but also evidence on policy performance and
assessments that can make such processes more inclusive
and sustainable.
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